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ABSTRACT
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Dissertation directed by: Professor John S. Baras
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Providing key management schemes for large scale multicast groups has be-
come an important problem due to many potential commercial applications such
as stock quote and software distribution on the Internet. For secure multicast
communication, all the group members have to share a common session key.
Since the member dynamics such as join or deletion do not necessarily terminate
the multicast session, it is important to update the session key to all the valid
members, so that the non-members do not have access to the future keys. Find-
ing efficient ways for key generation and distribution in the presence of member
dynamics is an actively researched problem.
This dissertation considers the single sender, multiple receiver model of secure
multicast communication. The goal is to develop schemes that have reduced
computational overhead at the time of key generation, minimize the amount of
message units required at the time of key updates, and minimize the number
of keys to be stored by the sender as well as receivers. In order to achieve this
goal, a key generation and distribution architecture based on rooted trees and
control panels is proposed. A control panel is assumed to consist of mutually
suspicious members who jointly generate the keys that are distributed to the rest
of the members. Based on the assumption about the control panel, we provide a
distributed key generation mechanism which allows a set of mutually suspicious
members to contribute to the generation of a joint secret without revealing their
individual contributions.
The key distribution scheme presented considers the member revocation event
and relates it to the key assignment of individual users. We define and show that
the entropy of the member revocation event plays an important role in determining
the number of keys assigned to a member. We claim that the number of keys
allocated to a member based on the elementary concepts from information theory
will also correspond to the minimum number of keys that need to be assigned
to a member unless additional functional relationship among keys exists, since
it completely captures the uncertainty of the member revocation event. We also
identify some weaknesses in the recent schemes in [17, 15], and solve an open
problem posed at Eurocrypt’99 [16].
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Internet applications, such as online games, newscast, stock quotes, multiparty
conferences, and military communications, can benefit from secure multicast com-
munications. In most of these applications, users typically receive identical in-
formation from a single or multiple senders. Hence, grouping these users into a
single multicast group and providing a common session encryption key to all of
them will reduce the number of message units to be encrypted by the senders.
Securing group communications or computations leads to challenging problems
such as maintaining communication integrity in the presence of group member-
ship changes, establishing source authentication, and minimizing key storage size
and number of update messages at the senders as well as the receivers.
This dissertation addresses the key generation and distribution problems asso-
ciated with maintaining communication integrity in the presence of membership
changes. We consider the single sender - multiple receiver model of the multicast
communications. Source authentication is not addressed in this dissertation.
1
1.1 Key Distribution
An important problem in preserving communication integrity is that of controlling
membership to the multicast group such that only the valid or the authorized,
legitimate members can have access to group communications. In this context,
secure communication and computation is achieved by providing a common group
key to all the valid members for session encryption, and updating the key when
there is a need. This common key is often called by various names such as session
key, traffic encrypting key or the net key [10, 11].
The key distribution and update scheme should be able to prevent any set
of members from collaborating or colluding and obtaining future keys or keys
assigned to other members. In particular, revoked members of the group should
not be able to collaborate and obtain the future keys of the multicast group.
The problem of controlling membership to the multicast group is reduced to
the problem of maintaining the following condition/invariant: at any time all
the valid group members and only the valid group members have access to the
current session key with no possible collusion from non-members.
A modified version of the key assignment problem is to find key distribution
methods that satisfy the invariant and also require the minimum number of keys
to be stored and updated with membership changes.
This modified problem is addressed using information theory concepts.
1.2 Key Generation
Another important problem in preserving communication integrity is to find
methods for a set of members to jointly generate keys without having to expose
2
their individual contributions to the generation of group keys.
Most of the currently available group key generation schemes fall into two
categories. They either generate group public keys with the help of a trusted
third party or are based on the generalization of the Diffie-Hellman (DH) tech-
nique for group keying. (The DH keys are common shared keys). The general-
ized Diffie-Hellman scheme, which has been extensively used in the recent group
communication protocols, involves several exponentiations and the computations
scale linearly as a function of the group size N. Both of these methods rely on as-
sumed cryptographic hard problems - performing discrete logarithm or factoring
an integer.
We present a key generation scheme that does not depend on the computa-
tional difficulties of the integer factoring or on discrete logarithm, but instead
makes use of the concept of a one-time pad. We provide a key generation scheme
that allows the key generating members to locally compute the one-time pads
and use it to securely exchange their individual shares without exposing them.
The padded shares are combined to generate the padded common secret. Our
scheme also provides a method to compute the group parameter that is a com-
bination of all the pads, and can be used to remove the combined padding effect
and extract the common secret. If the key generation mechanism can provide
uniformly distributed variables over an interval of interest, this scheme will be
resistant to attacks from any individual member or up to (N − 2) collaborating
members. An advantage of our scheme is that it can be used for generation of
group shared keys as well as public keys.
3
1.3 Contributions
This dissertation makes the following technical contributions:
1. It defines a distributed key generation scheme that allows a set of members
to contribute to the common key generation without exposing individual
secrets. The scheme allows members to locally compute the one-time pads
and a group binding parameter that removes the combined effects of the
padding at the time of common secret construction. This has the advantage
that the future one-time pads need not be pre-distributed and stored. The
scheme can be used for generating group shared keys, or public keys with
suitable modifications.
2. It explains how to use basic concepts of information theory to: (a) determine
the optimal number of keys allocated to a member, (b) find the average
key length that can be supported, (c) interpret the weaknesses of current
schemes, and (d) determine optimal cluster size with maximum amount of
uncertainty as to which cluster will be compromised next.
3. It defines a key management architecture that makes use of the key gener-
ation and distribution schemes mentioned above.
1.4 Dissertation Organization
The second chapter reviews the background work and identifies the requirements
of the key management architecture from the viewpoint of key generation, distri-
bution, and rekeying. The third chapter presents the new key generation scheme
based on the requirements identified in the second chapter and its analysis. The
4
fourth chapter presents the notion of optimal schemes for key distribution. The
fifth chapter presents a clustering strategy based on maximum uncertainty of
cluster revocation to provide an optimal key allocation problem which was posed
as an open problem at Eurocrypt’99. The last chapter presents some of the




In this chapter, we present the key distribution and generation approaches pro-
posed to date and analyze their properties. We define the factors that influence
the design of a key management scheme and then identify desirable properties of a
multicast key management scheme. This enables us to evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of the schemes discussed and the different optimality claims made by
these schemes. Since the terminology used by these schemes varies, we introduce
a common terminology and the associated notation to provide a basis for scheme
comparison.
2.1 Factors influencing the design of a Key Man-
agement Scheme
The design of a key management scheme is influenced by the following factors:
• Heterogeneous nature of the group membership affects the possible type
of encryption algorithm to be used, and the length of the key that can be
6
supported by an end user.
• The cost of setting up and initializing the entire system parameters, such
as, selection of the Group Controller (GC), group announcement, member
join and initial key distribution.
• Administrative policies, such as those defining which members have the
authorization to generate keys.
• Required level of performance of parameters, such as session sustainability,
and key generation rates.
• Required additional external support mechanisms, such as the availability
of a Certificate Authority (CA).
2.1.1 Desirable Properties of a Multicast Key Manage-
ment Scheme
In addition to the facts mentioned above, a multicast key management scheme
needs to exhibit the following desirable properties:
1. Ability to handle membership changes. This is important since the whole
group must share a single session encryption key. The communication in-
tegrity in the presence of membership changes implies the ability of the
group to update the session key and distribute it to the valid members with
possible back traffic protection.
2. Ability to prevent user collusion. This is important since a subset of mem-
bers or the deleted members should not be able to collaborate and construct
the keys of other members or the future group keys.
7
3. The ability to provide scalability in terms of security related administration
such as member admission, deletion, key revocation and updates. This is
important so that the security administration does not become the perfor-
mance bottleneck.
4. Ability to provide inter-domain issues related to security such as security
parameters and cryptographic schemes of various clusters. This is impor-
tant since some of the members may belong to more than one groups and
may need to communicate across the groups.
2.1.2 Abstract Parameters and the Terminology Used
We now present the abstract parameters and common terminology used to explain
the properties of various published secure multicast schemes.
1. The set of N receivers (users) in the single sender multiple receiver multicast
group is denoted by M = {M1,M2, · · · ,MN}.
2. The Group Controller or the Group Center (GC) is assumed to be the
sender of the group and GC 6∈ M . Hence, the GC is not considered as a
receiver.
3. The Session Key is denoted by SK. It is also called the Traffic Encrypting
Key or TEK in some of the recent work.
4. The Key Encrypting Key is denoted by KEK.
5. Each user Mi ∈M holds a set of keys denoted by K(Mi).
6. The set of all keys used by the group is denoted by K. We note SK ∈ K.
Also K = ∪Mi∈MK(Mi).
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7. The probability of member Mi being revoked is denoted by pi.
8. The Algebraic expression Hd = −
∑N
i=1 pi logd pi denotes the d−ary entropy
of the member revocation event.
9. We say members Mi and Mj can collude and compromise member Ml if
K(Ml) ⊆ K(Mi) ∪ K(Mj). Hence, a key assignment free of compromise
due to user collusion requires K(Ml) 6⊆
⋃
Mi∈M ;Mi 6=MlK(Mi).
10. Encryption of a message m by key K is denoted by {m}K
11. Transmission of an encrypted message m from member A to member B,
using key K, is denoted by: A −→ B : {m}K .
12. We will denote by K−1 the private key corresponding to the public key K.
Hence the public key pair is denoted as (K,K−1).
2.2 Summary of Multicast Key Management Schemes
We first summarize the multicast key management schemes that provide key
distribution functionality. These schemes do not address key generation or group
initialization. We then review schemes that describe key generation.
2.2.1 Group Key Management Protocol
The Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) in [7, 8], proposes a single GC
that is allowed to perform all the security related administrative tasks including
member join, deletion, maintenance of ACL, and key generation and distribution.
The GKMP has the following features:
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1. The group is managed by a single group controller (GC).
2. The group uses Group Traffic Encrypting Key (GTEK), and a future Group
Key Encrypting Key (GKEK).
3. The Group Key Packet (GKP) generated by the GC at update step n is
given by GKPn = {GTEKn, GKEKn+1}.
The following are the advantages of this method:
1. A single encryption can update the keys for the whole group.
2. The GC has information about the entire membership.
3. The number of keys to be stored is two, the possible minimal value for any
scheme without authentication requirements.
The following are the disadvantages of the method:
1. Since all the members share a single key encrypting key (and session key),
failure or compromise of a single member compromises the group key packet,
and hence the entire future group communication. This forces the entire
group to be reinitialized.
2. Single GC becomes a performance bottleneck in terms of security related
operations since every join, and deletion has to be done by the GC.
3. Since GC is the only entity permitted to generate the keys, failure or com-
promise of GC will prevent proper key updates as needed.
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2.2.2 Scalable Key Management with Core Based Trees
In an attempt to support scalability in terms of security administration, the
Scalable Multicast Key Distribution scheme associated with the Core Based Trees
(CBT) was proposed by Ballardie [36]. The following are the properties of the
CBT based key management scheme:
1. The CBT uses a single GC to generate the session key and the key encrypt-
ing key.
2. The CBT attains scalability in terms of security administration by explic-
itly allowing any valid member of the group to admit new members and
distribute the keys.
The CBT has the following drawbacks:
1. Since the CBT proposes to distribute a single key encrypting key and a sin-
gle session encrypting key, compromise of a single member will compromise
these two keys, and compromise the future group communication.
2. The scalability of CBT comes at the expense of having to assume that
all the group members can be unconditionally (without any verification
mechanism) trusted to distribute the keys only to the valid future members.
2.2.3 Cluster Base Protocols
Since the GKMP and CBT use a single Group Key packet for the entire group,
deletion or compromise of a single member invalidates the entire group keys.
In [35, 9], a solution to this problem was suggested by proposing to partition the
group into clusters. The following are the features of these schemes:
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1. A given group is partitioned into clusters.
2. Each cluster is assigned a cluster controller.
3. Each cluster has its own cluster session encrypting key and the cluster key
encrypting key.
4. Cluster controller generates the cluster keys, and performs security admin-
istration for the cluster.
An advantage of this scheme is that the impact of rekeying is limited to the
individual cluster.
The following are the problems associated with these schemes:
1. Finding intermediate single nodes/members that “can be unconditionally
trusted” to perform security related operations for cluster control may be
difficult. Since the remote monitoring and verification of a single node
is difficult, there have been several recent attempts to develop “collective
entity” or threshold based administration.
2. Each cluster uses a single key encrypting key. Hence, a single member
compromise inside the cluster will compromise the future keys of the cluster
as in the case of GKMP, and CBT.
The schemes summarized so far use a common future key encrypting key.
Though this approach minimizes the storage requirements, compromise of a single
member leads to compromise of all the future keys. Instead, if each member is
given a unique key encrypting key, revocation or compromise of a member does
not affect the key encrypting keys of other members. However, the key update
will require O(N) encryption in this case. A desired solution is a tradeoff between
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these two extremes. One such solution is based on the rooted trees based key
distribution, in which more than one key encrypting key is distributed to every
member.
2.2.4 Tree Based Schemes for Key Distribution
The first attempt at using a rooted tree based key distribution approach for
efficient member revocation was independently proposed in [10] and [11]. Modi-
fications to reduce the computational and key storage requirements at the time
of key updates for these two methods were later presented in [17, 15, 14, 13]. We
will briefly review the basic concept behind the rooted tree based key distribution
below.
2.2.5 Distribution of Keys on the Tree
As a concrete illustration, figure 2.1 presents a KEK distribution based on a
binary rooted tree for eight members. In this approach, each leaf of the tree
represents a unique member of the group; i.e. the leafs are in one-to-one cor-
respondence with members. Each node of the tree represents a key. The set of
keys along the path from the root to a particular leaf node are assigned to the
member represented by that leaf node. For example, member M1 in figure 2.1 is
assigned KEKs {KO, K2.1, K1.1, K0.1}.
If there is no member deletion/revocation or compromise, the common KEK
denoted by KO can be used to update the session key for all the members. The
tree based structure also induces a natural hierarchical grouping among the mem-
bers. By logically placing the members appropriately, the GC can choose the
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Figure 2.1: The Logical Key Tree of [10, 11, 13, 15, 17]
For example, in figure 2.1, members M5,M6,M7, and M8 exclusively share the
key K2.2. The GC can use the key K2.2 to selectively communicate with mem-
bers M5,M6,M7, and M8. Hence, the local grouping of the members and the
keys shared on the tree may be decided by the GC based on application specific
needs. In order to be able to selectively disseminate information to a subset of
group members, the GC has to ensure that the common key assigned to a subset
is not assigned to any member not belonging to that subset. In figure 2.1, if the
group controller needs to update the key K2.2, it can do so by first generating
a new version of K2.2, and then performing two encryptions, one with K1.3 and
the other with K1.4. Using the notation {m}K to denote the encryption of m
with key K, and the notation A −→ B : {m}K to denote the secure exchange of
message m from A to B, we note that the following two messages are needed to
update key K2.2 to the relevant members of the group.
GC −→M5,M6 : {K2.2}K1.3
GC −→M7,M8 : {K2.2}K1.4
Although we used a tree with uniform depth to all its leaf nodes, this is not
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necessary in general. The selection of uniform depth relates to the maximum
entropy of member revocation event as explained in chapter 4.
2.2.6 Member Revocation in Rooted Trees
Since the SK and the root key are common to all the members in the multicast
group, they have to be invalidated at each time a member is revoked. Apart from
these two keys, all the intermediate KEKs of the revoked member need to be
invalidated. In the event there is bulk member revocation, the GC has to:
• Identify all the invalid keys,
• Find the minimal number of valid keys that need to be used to transmit
the updated keys.
Member M1 in figure 2.1 is indexed by the set of five keys {KO, K2.1, K1.1, K0.1}.
Revoking M1 is equivalent to invalidating these four keys, generating four new
keys, and updating the keys of the appropriate valid members. When M1 is re-
voked, the following key updates need to be performed: (a) members M5 −M8
need to update {KO}, (b) members M3−M4 need to update {KO, K2.1}, and (c)
member M2 needs to update {KO, K2.1, K1.1}.
Revocation of a single member involves O(logdN) messages to update logdN
keys on the rooted d− ary tree. If the number of members to be revoked is two
or more, the number of messages may be further minimized depending on the lo-
cation of the revoked members. In order to further reduce the number of message
updates under bulk member removal, the index of the valid members has to be
considered and grouped so that the maximum number of valid members share a
common key. Direct computations are based on Boolean function minimization
15
techniques and are not computationally efficient.
2.3 Generation of the Group Keys
We noted that a single node failure at GC can lead to termination of the security
related operations of the group. We also noted from the CBT, and IoLus that
finding “trusted” intermediate nodes may be a problem in a network. Even in
the case of the rooted trees, single node GC is used for key generation which may
compromise the whole system if the GC were to be compromised. In our early
work [22, 24], we presented a cluster panel based key generation scheme. The
approach presented can be used by a set of distributed members to generate a
common key. In the context of multicast key management, the cluster control
panel jointly generates the common keys and uses them directly or as seeds
for generating the keys on the trees. We present the group Diffie-Hellman(DH)
approach presented by [2] which does not require a trusted third party for key
generation. The Group RSA is also possible [26] but requires a trusted third party.
Moreover, the group RSA involves additional testings that are not required in the
group Diffie-Hellman Scheme.
2.3.1 Group Diffie-Hellman Scheme
The joint group key generation can lead to a group shared key or a group public
key. In the event that the generated key is a shared key, a generalized Diffie-
Hellman (DH) approach proposed in [2] can be used. If the desired group key
is to be a public key, depending on whether the key belongs to the ElGamal or
RSA type, there are two different recent proposals that allow a set of members
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N number of key generating members
i, j, l, m key generating member indices
Mi key generating member i
q order of the algebraic group
g generator in G
Ki secret key of member Mi
ri random exponent ∈ Z∗p , chosen by member Mi.
K joint key/secret generated by N members.
Ki,j shared key between members Mi, and Mj .
Table 2.1: Notations for Group DH problem
to generate the joint public keys with the assistance of an information theoretic
helper. In many applications such as the secure multicast protocols proposed
in [9, 22], it is not always possible to find an “information theoretic helper”.
Another distributed joint secret generation scheme not based on any hardness
problems was proposed in [37, 38]. Although the scheme is computationally
efficient, it has some security weakness that will allow two or more members
to collaborate and obtain the contribution of individual members. We briefly
describe each of these methods below.
2.3.2 Group Diffie-Hellman Extension Keys
The following notations and assumptions are used in describing the group DH
problem. These notations are from [2], and are used here to maintain consistency
with [2].
All arithmetic operations are performed in the group G which is a cyclic
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subgroup of prime order q in Z∗p , with p = lq + 1 for some l ∈ N . We first
describe the simple two-party case and then describe the multiparty case.
2.3.3 Two Party DH Problem
In the simplest setup consisting of two members, denoted Mi and Mj , a solution
to the problem is to perform the Diffie Hellman secret generation as follows:
Members Mi and Mj agree upon the group and a generator g. Members Mi and
Mj choose random integers a, b, such that 1 ≤ a, b ≤ q − 1, and compute ga and
gb. Members then exchange (message exchange is kept to the simplest possible
to illustrate the concept)
Mi −→Mj : ga
Mj −→Mi : gb
After the exchange, each member can independently compute gab from the
message received from the other member. Assuming that performing discrete
logarithm is difficult, if a, b are the private keys of members Mi and Mj then the
group public key is given by gab. The group, however, does not share a common
private key, and the authors in [2] proposed a group key without allowing the
members to share the common private key. Every member performs O(log ab)
“squaring” to compute gab. The minimum number of message exchanges needed
for key establishment is two.
2.3.4 Multiparty Group DH Problem
There are three versions of the multiparty group DH key extensions available
in [2]. We will describe the basic one denoted Generalized DH.1 (GDH.1). All
three algorithms consist of two steps called up-flow and down-flow. In the up-flow
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stage members collect the contributions from other members and propagate to
the next highest indexed member with modification in message sequence. The
message exchange for the up-flow is given by: Mi −→Mi+1 : {g
∏
(al|l∈[1,j])|j∈[1,i]}.
For example, member M5 receives {ga1 , ga1a2 , ga1a2a3 , ga1a2a3a4} and forwards
{ga1, ga1a2 , · · · , ga1a2a3a4a5} to member M6. In the up-flow procedure, each member
needs to perform one exponentiation. From the indices of the message, member
Mi sends i messages to member Mi+1. The last member of the group, MN
computes the group key as K = ga1a2a3···aN .
At this stage, member MN can broadcast the session key value to all the
members. Instead of broadcasting the K to all the members, in order to provide
the authentication part, the key scheme in [2] has the down-flow part as follows:
MN−i −→MN−i+1 : {gπ(al|l 6∈[i,j])|j∈[1,i]}.
In the down-flow stage i exponentiations are performed by Mi. One of these
enables Mi to compute K, and the rest of the exponentiations ensure that the rest
of the group members eventually receive appropriate shares. In order to illustrate
this case, we assume that the group size N = 6. In this example, the last member
M6 sends M5 the message {ga6, ga1a6 , ga1a2a6 · · · , ga1a2a3a4a6}. Using ga1a2a3a4a6 , it
computes (ga1a2a3a4a5)a6 = ga1a2a3a4a5a6 . Member M5 raises the rest of the terms
to the power a5 and distributes to M4. This process is repeated by each member
Mi(1 ≤ i ≤ N) with appropriate modifications until M1 computes the session
key. There are O(N2) messages and exponentiations for such a process.
From the computational steps we note that the group DH is useful in cases
where the group symmetric keys are generated or when the group public keys,
with no member having the whole of the group private keys, are to be generated.
It was noted in [2] that the generation of group ElGamal keys with all the mem-
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bers contributing without hiding the secrets is not feasible in this setup. In order
to provide a common private key for the generated public key, members have to
add the individual private keys.
2.3.5 Generating Group ElGamal Keys
In Yung [27], each key generating member was associated with an individual
ElGamal public key. The private keys of all the members were added to generate
the group private key. The group public key is then the product of the individual
public keys. Computational steps are summarized below.
1. The Mi randomly chooses 1 ≤ ai ≤ q − 1 and computes the public key gai .
2. Member Mi sends ai to other members asMi −→Mj(1 ≤ j ≤ N ; j 6= i) : ai.





4. The group public key is the product of the individual public keys modulo








Although this method has less computations, it exposes the individual private
keys of the key generating members.
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2.4 A Distributed Scheme without a Trusted
Third Party
In [37, 38], the following solution for contributed joint secret generation was
proposed. We present the approach in an algorithmic manner.
1. Members are indexed and every member knows the left or the right neighbor
of it.
2. Every member has generated its own secret random integer using an ap-
propriate method.
3. The member M1 generates a random number α within the range, and adds
his/her secret γ1to it, and securely communicates δ1 = (α + γ1) to the
second member. M1 −→M2 : {α+ δ1}.
4. For i = 2, · · · , n− 1
member Mi adds its secret γi to the quantity δi−1 = α +
∑i−1
j=1 γj, received
from member Mi−1 and securely communicates δi = α+
∑i
j=1 γj to member
Mi+1.
5. Member n receives the quantity δi securely communicated by member Mn−1,
adds its secret γn and securely communicates the result δn = α +
∑n
j=1 γj
to the first member.




Figure 2.2 presents a view of the distributed computations for group secret












































Figure 2.2: Distributed secret generation algorithm
shown in Figure 2.2) can perform the following steps to generate the joint secret
of the group:
1. Generate two random integers γ, α1,1 and compute δ1 = (γ + α1,1), and
send the result to member M2 (the “next” member in the group) as
M1 −→M2: {{T1, I, 1, δ1}K−11 }K2.
2. The following steps are repeated for i = 2, . . . , n− 1:
(a) Member Mi generates a random integer αi,1.
(b) Member i then operates on the quantity it received from member Mi−1
as δi = (δi−1 + αi,1).
(c) Member Mi then sends the result to member Mi+1 as
Mi −→Mi+1: {{Ti, I, 1, δi}K−1i }Ki+1.
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3. Eventually, the group member Mn receives δn−1 and then generates a uniformly-
distributed random number αn,1, performs δn ≡ (δn−1 + αn,1), and then
securely sends it to the initiating member M1 as
Mn −→M1: {{Tn, I, 1, δn}K−1n }K1.
4. The initiator (M1) then decrypts it and performs
θ1 = (−γ + δn) (2.3)
and sends θ1 to each member i, for i = 2, . . . n, as
M1 −→Mi : {{T1, I, 1, θ1}K−11 }Ki.
If there is no member collaboration, this approach prevents a member from
knowing the individual secret of any other member. The computations scale as
O(N) with N being the group size. We now show that this scheme reveals the
secret of any one member under the following collaboration of any two members.
The proposed attack works even for the boundary indices if we consider the
member indices as forming a physical ring, thus providing a right and left neighbor
for any given member.
2.4.1 A user Collusion Problem of the Scheme
Let Mi and Mi+2 be collaborators. After computing the quantity δi = α +∑i
j=1 γj, member Mi securely communicates it to member Mi+1. It also securely
communicates the quantity (without the knowledge of member Mi+1) to member
Mi+2.
The member Mi+1 computes the secret δi+1 = α+
∑i+1
j=1 γj and securely com-
municates it to member Mi+2. Using these two quantities, member Mi+2 can
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extract the secret of member Mi+1 in a straight forward manner. Hence, the
individual secret is not guarded against collusion in this approach.
2.4.2 Summary of the Distributed Key Generation Schemes
From the key generation schemes, we note that the Group Diffie-Hellman method
provides resistance to user collusion but can not provide public keys. On the
other hand, the scheme in [37, 38] can be used for shared keys or public keys.
The scheme in [37, 38] however suffers from user collusion.
In the next chapter, we provide a new key generation scheme that can be used
to generate a joint secret while resisting user collusion. After initialization, our
approach can be combined with the scheme by Koblitz [37, 38] to improve the





We present a set of possible distributed key generation schemes that can be used
by the control panels introduced in the previous section. In doing so, we first
present the existing feasible schemes and then present an approach that can be
thought of as generalization of the one-time pad techniques. We note that the
scheme proposed doesn’t depend on any property of secure multicast and hence
can be used in other applications which require joint secret generation as well.
As a reminder, we note that the key management proposals in [9, 36] lacked a
mechanism to select, and allow intermediate nodes to perform key generation and
distribution. This chapter addresses the issue of selecting a set of intermediate
nodes to jointly perform the key generation for the group. Our procedure admits
both shared key and public key generation.
The key generating group consists of N members who are assumed to be mu-
tually suspicious. Each member is provided with group initialization parameters
such as individual pad and group binding parameter. A member generates its
share of the secret which we call Fractional Key (FK), hides it using the pad,
securely exchanges it with the rest of the members and combines shares of all
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the members to generate the hidden joint secret. The group is also parameter-
ized using a group binding parameter that can be used to remove the combined
effect of all the pads, thus revealing the joint secret to the members possessing
the hidden joint secret. In our approach, we assume that there is a trusted third
party, such as the group initiator, that will select and initialize the group key
generation procedure. We now present our scheme for allowing a set of specific
members to generate the joint keys.
3.1 Assumptions
The following is a list of the underlying assumptions of our proposed scheme:
• There exists a binary operation ⊕ that operates on the set S of elements
generating the secret such that S ⊕ S :→ S.
• The shared keys are generated by a fixed number of participants n.
• A mechanism exists for certifying the members participating in the key
generation procedure, for securely exchanging the quantities required in
the algorithm and for authenticating the source of these quantities.
• Every member can generate uniformly distributed, independent random
numbers in a given range.
3.2 Notations Used
The following notations are used to describe the different quantities used in the
proposed method:
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αi,j: The one-time pad of the ith member at the jth secret update iteration.
θj : The pad binding parameter at the jth secret update iteration.
FKi,j: The fractional key of the ith member at the jth secret update iteration.
HFKi,j: The hidden FKi,j of the ith member at the jth secret update iteration.
SKj: The group shared key at the jth key update instance.
A −→ B : X : Principal A sends principal B a message X .
Given the above listed assumptions, the joint secret generation scheme consists
of the following major parts:
1. Initialization: distribution of initial pad and binding parameters.
2. Generation of the common shared secret using the hidden fractional keys
of individual members.
3.3 Initialization
The group initiator chooses n uniformly distributed, mutually independent ran-
dom numbers (initial pads of members) {αi,0}ni=0. It also chooses θ0 =
∑n
i=0 αi,0.
A member i is distributed a unique initial pad αi,0, and the initial group binding
parameter θ0.
3.4 Description of the Computational Steps


























Figure 3.1: Iteration and mappings of the key generation algorithm
1. At the time of initialization, n members are selected (depending on an
application specific procedure) and given initial pads denoted by
αi,1; 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that
α1,1 ⊕ α2,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ αn,1 = θ1. (3.1)
Here, ⊕ is the binary operation defined over the set of valid keys. For
example, one possible selection is to set ⊕ to be modulo p with a large
prime p.
2. In the first iteration step, every member i uniformly picks a value FKi,1
from the set S of valid individual shares, and generates its hidden share as
HFKi,1 = FKi,1 ⊕ αi,1. These shares are then securely communicated to
all other members.






⊕(αi,1 ⊕ FKi,1) (3.2)







and λ1θ1 is the result of operation ⊕ performed on θ1, λ times. Especially,
we note that λ1 need not be a scalar (i.e. need not belong to the same field
or ring as αi,j or θ. This is essential in applying our method to Elliptic
curves).
4. Every member then locally computes the new value of the group shared
secret θ2 by removing the effect of the initial shared secret value
θ2 = λ1θ1 ⊕ θ2 ⊕ µ1θ1 (3.5)
(where µ is the appropriate inverse of λ. For example, if ⊕ is addition
operation under modulo p where p is a large prime, then µ = p− λ.)
5. Every member i locally computes its new pad as
αi,2 = θ2 ⊕ γ2FKi,2 (3.6)
essentially removing the effect of its own share.
6. At the share update step j , the procedure is:
• generate new individual shares FKi,j
• combine it with the individual dynamic pad αi,j to generate HFKi,j
• exchange HFK’s of all the members securely
• compute the new shared secret θj+1 = λjθj⊕ θj+1⊕ µjθj with µ is the
appropriate inverse of λ.
• compute the new individual pad αi,j+1 = θj+1 ⊕ γj+1FKi,j+1.
This summarizes the computational steps of the proposed scheme. We now
identify possible structures that are relevant to this computational scheme.
29
3.5 Necessary Algebraic Structures
From the brief description of our proposed scheme, we note that the following
properties are needed for the operator ⊕ along with the set S:
• Combination of the pads along with the individual shares should lead to
HFKs that are contained in the set S, else the shared key SK need not
belong to set S. Hence, the operation ⊕ on set S is algebraically closed.
• Even if the members combine the HFK’s in a specified order, independent
of which HFKs in the order are processed first, the result of the combination
should be same. Hence, the operator⊕ needs to be associative. For example
(HFK1,j ⊕ HFK2,j) ⊕ HFK3,j = HFK1,j ⊕ (HFK2,j ⊕HFK3,j) (3.7)
• In order to guarantee freshness, members need to be able to separate the
values of the previous and new shared secret, and operator ⊕ also needs
to be commutative. This means that the expression
(α1,j ⊕ FK1,j)⊕ (α2,j ⊕ FK2,j)⊕ · · · (αn,j ⊕ FSn,j) (3.8)
can be separated and written as
(α1,j ⊕ α2,j · · · ⊕ αn,j)⊕ (FS1,j ⊕ FS2,j · · · FSn,j) = λjθj ⊕ θj+1. (3.9)
• Since combining HFKs leads to the hidden shared key value λjθj ⊕ θj+1,
we need to find the inverse of λθj to remove the effect of the previous key
θj . If elements FKi,j are uniformly picked from set S, then the value of θj
will be uniformly distributed and hence θj can take any value from the set
S. As a result, every element in the set S has an inverse with respect to
the operation ⊕.
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It is important to note that if the removal of the previous θj is not required,
then the inverse is not needed. If the elements do not possess (have) the as-
sociative property under ⊕, the minimal necessary structure is that the set S
along with the operator ⊕ is groupoid. If associativity is allowed, the semigroup
structure is enough.
The minimal necessary algebraic structure that allows associativity, commu-
tativity and existence of an inverse for all given elements is a commutative group.
One immediate example is a group of prime order which is widely used in cryp-
tosystems.
Using the approach presented above, we present a group shared key generation
scheme, and a group ElGamal public key scheme.
3.6 Generation of Group Shared Key
The computational grid diagram for this method is the same as before, and is
shown below with slight modifications.
The key generation algorithm is an iterative process depicted in Figure 3.2. Each
iteration j requires as input (indicated as step (0) in the figure) a set of one-time
pads αi,j, i = 1, . . . , n, and the binding parameter θj , which are obtained from
the initialization algorithm for iteration j = 1, and from the preceding iterations
for j > 1.
The iterative key generation algorithm consists of the following steps (1)-(5):
1. For i = 1, . . . , n, a member i generates a cryptographically-secure random
number FKi,j.
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Figure 3.2: Iteration and mappings of the key generation algorithm
and all the members securely exchange the HFKs as ∀ 1 ≤ l,m ≤ n, l 6= m,
l −→ m: {{HFKl,j}K−1
l
}Km.
3. Once the exchange is complete, each member computes the new group
parameter θj+1 as
θj+1 = λθj ⊕ HFK1,j ⊕ HFK2,j ⊕ · · · ⊕ HFKn,j.
⇒ θj+1 = FK1,j ⊕ FK2,j ⊕ · · · FKn,j.
4. If the resulting group parameter θj+1 is cryptographically-insecure for a
particular application, all members can repeat steps (1) - (3) creating a
new high quality group parameter θj+1.
5. For i = 1, . . . , n, a member i computes αi,j+1 = θj+1 ⊕ FKi,j, and SKj =
f(θj+1) where f(·) is a pseudo random function.
3.7 Generation of the Group Elgamal Keys over
Z∗p
We assume that all the members agree on prime p, and generator g.

























Figure 3.3: Iteration and mappings of the key generation algorithm
1. For i = 1, . . . , n, a member i randomly picks up a number FKi,j with
0 ≤ FKi,j ≤ p − 2 and generates gFKi,j . The public key is (p, g, gFKi,j).
The private key is FKi,j.
2. All the members publish their public key (p, g, gFKi,j). This prevents mem-
bers from introducing any bias the group private key later.
3. For i = 1, . . . , n, a member i generates a quantity
HFKi,j = (αi,j + FKi,j) mod p, and then all members securely exchange
the HFKs as
∀ 1 ≤ l,m ≤ n, l 6= m,
l −→ m: {{HFKl,j}FK−1
l,j−1
}FKm,j−1 .
4. Once the exchange is complete, each member computes the θj+1 as
θj+1 = ((p − 2)θj +
∑i=n





5. If the resulting group key pair is cryptographically-insecure for a particular
application, all members can repeat steps (1) - (3) creating a new high
quality key pair.
6. For i = 1, . . . , n, a member i computes the iteration update as
αi,j+1 = (θj+1 + FKi,j) mod p.
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The steps (1) - (5) present the computational steps for generating the keys at
each update. At the end of step (1), a member i generates the jth update of its
ElGamal public key pair. Member i then hides the key in step (2) by generating a
HFKi,j and sends it to the other participating members. The public/private key
pairs used in the exchanges of iteration j are the individual ElGamal fractional
key pairs of iteration j−1 At this stage, every member can independently combine
the shares of all the key generating members and derive the group private key θj .
If the members decide not to generate any public key pair, then they can use this
as a group secret shared key. However, if the group decides to generate a group
ElGamal public key pair, the members then obtain the value of θj mod (p− 1) as
the private key. The corresponding public key is given by gθj.
We note that the key generation procedure described above combines the
following different features:
• For a single member, generation of the public key pair uses the standard
ElGamal method which is based on the assumption that it is difficult to
perform the discrete logarithm function.
• Generation of the HFK’s is based on the result that if two numbers are
generated uniformly and independently, identically distributed (iid), then
given a non-trivial function of them, it is difficult to derive the individual
components.
• Generation of the group public key is a generalized ElGamal public key sys-
tem. The main result here is that although every member can individually
generate the same group public key pair, they don’t have the direct access
each other’s private keys.
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• Even if an attacker breaks the group private key (via traffic analysis) and,
hence, the group parameter θj for the next iteration, the attacker still has
to break another (n − 1) ElGamal keys to obtain the messages exchanged
in the next key update. From the computational point of view, this implies
the group key length can be made smaller if the message is relevant for only
a limited time frame.
• The time-varying pad αi,j+1 is computed such that, for an outsider, obtain-
ing αi,j+1 is as hard as obtaining the actual key FKj at any given time.
• Although all the members each have a HFKi,j, obtaining the FKi,j involves
brute force search. Hence, even if a fellow member becomes an attacker,
that rogue member has the same amount of computational burden in ob-
taining the FK as a crypto analyst; i.e. trust is not unconditional.
• By the same argument above, we note that only the member i can compute
αi,j+1. Everyone else has to perform a brute force search before finding
αi,j+1, which is time-varying.
• Even if an outsider captures and decrypts a packet and obtains the HFK
of a single participating member, the attacker is faced with the following
challenges:
1. Having a HFK does not give any advantage to the attacker in decrypt-
ing any message encrypted with a gθj .
2. The outside attacker has to find the corresponding remaining (n− 1)
HFKs. Such is the case since the keys are transported in a secure
manner. Hence, only the participating members have the direct access
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to the HFKs. For an outsider, it may be much harder to simultaneously
attack and obtain these (n− 1) parts that have limited lifetime.
• FK’s, as well as the GK, are checked for standard weaknesses before being
used.
3.8 Recovering the Fractional Key of a Single
Node
The following steps are involved in recovery of the FKı̃,j and αı̃,j of the node failed
ı̃, where j represents the iteration number in which the node was compromised
or failed.
1. Any one FK-generating member—called the Recovery Initiator (RI)—must
initiate recovery and give the HFK of the failed node ı̃ to the newly-elected
node i as
RI −→ i : {{HFKı̃,j}FK−1RI,j}FKi,j .
2. The RI must also give the newly-elected node i the current θj as
RI −→ i : {{θj}FK−1RI,j}FKi,j .
3. Using the same algorithm as is used for distributed initialization only with
αl,j replaced with βl, the RI initiates a distributed process whereby member
l is given two random numbers (γ, βl) as in the initialization with γ ≡∑i=n
i=1 βi mod p.
4. For l = 1, . . . , n−1, each node l then computes a modified hidden fractional
key ĤFKl,j = (βl+FKl,j) mod p and hands it to the newly-elected member
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i as l −→ i : {{ĤFKl,j}FK−1
l,j
}FKi,j .
5. Node i then combines all of the modified HFKs and recovers the private key
FKı̃,j using the operation FKı̃,j = {θj + (p− 1)(γ +
∑i=n
i=1 ĤFKi,j)}mod p.
6. Node i then extracts the pad αı̃,j using the operation
αı̃,j = (θj + (p− 1)(γFKı̃,j)) mod p.
We note that the recovered values of FK−1ı̃,j and αı̃,j are unique. Once the
new node recovers the fractional key of the compromised node, it can inform the
other contributing members to update the iteration number j to j + 1, and then
all members can execute the key generation algorithm. Note that even though
the newly-elected member recovers the compromised fractional key and pad, the
next key generation operation of the new node does not use the compromised
key or pad. Hence, even if the attacker possesses the fractional key or pad at
iteration j, it does not allow the attacker to obtain the future fractional keys or
pads without any computation.
Although n = 3 can generate the keys, if a single member exposes its se-
cret, the remaining two members can compute each others pads as follows, thus
breaking the system. Hence, four is the minimum necessary member size of this
procedure. This is summarized as
Lemma 3.1: Independent of how non-trivial the bit-length of the key is,
operating with n = 3, a FA can invalidate the system’s zero knowledge proof
capability within the group.
Proof: Assume that the time instant at which one member i (i = 1 or 2
or 3) becomes a rogue is j. At this time the members have values of α1,j =
(HFK2,j +HFK3,j) mod p, α2,j = (HFK3,j +HFK1,j) mod p, α3,j = (HFK1,j +
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HFK2,j) mod p. Every member also has access to the current θj and their own
FKl,j (l = 1, 2, 3). At this stage, obtaining the α component of any other
member is as computationally intensive as an outside attacker trying to obtain θj .
However, if a member, say i = 1, is compromised and releases its secret α1,j , then
each of the other members can use this and compute FK1,j = (α1,j + θj) mod p.
Since the θj = (FK1,j + FK2,j + FK3,j) mod p, each member can now compute
the other member’s FK as well.
3.9 Proofs of Computational Security
In this section, we will show that the given scheme is protected from the external
threat of traffic analysis. In doing the analysis we will assume that the number
of key generating members is even. We also show that given the HFK of all
the members involved in key generation, the best thing a crypto analyst can do
is to guess the random number arbitrarily (if the random variables are chosen
uniformly). We also present a measure of departure from the ideal case in terms
of mutual information.
3.10 Mutual Information between the FK and
HFK
In the scheme described above, we note that at each time instance j, a member i
first generates a FKi,j and performs modulo addition of it with the time varying
pad αi,j to generate a HFKi,j. We note that every member generates its FKi,j
using a random number generator that outputs iid random variables. Hence:
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• By assumption FKi,j’s are mutually independent. Moreover, the FKi,j’s
at different time updates are also independent. i.e.
I(FKi,j ∧ FKl,m) = H(FKi,j)−H(FKi,j|FKl,m) = 0 (3.10)
where (i, j) 6= (l,m).
• The time varying pad αi,j is given by




Hence, αi,j is independent of FKi,j−1, and FKi,j i.e. the pad of member i
at time update j is independent of all FK’s of that member which implies
I(αi,j ∧ FKi,l) = H(αi,j)−H(αi,j|FKi,l) = 0, ∀l.
• Since the pad αi,j of a member j is a function of the FKs of the other n−1
key generating members at time update instance i − 1, and since all the
FKs are iid, we have that αi,j is independent of all the FKs at any other
time instance, i.e. I(αi,j ∧Rl,m) = H(αi,j)−H(αi,j|Rl,m) = 0, ∀m 6= j − 1.
Using these observations, at key update time instance j, for member i, the
mutual information between FK and HFK can be computed as:
I(HFKi,j ∧ FKi,j) = I(αi,j ⊕ FKi,j ∧ FKi,j) (3.12)
= H(αi,j ⊕ FKi,j)−H(αi,j ⊕ FKi,j|FKi,j). (3.13)
= H(αi,j ⊕ FKi,j)−H(αi,j). (3.14)
From this equation we note that if the FKs are uniform as well as iid, then
αi,j ⊕ FKi,j is also uniform. For this case we have that
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I(αi,j ⊕ FKi,j ∧ FKi,j) = H(αi,j ⊕ FKi,j)−H(αi,j) (3.15)
= logL− logL = 0. (3.16)
Hence, if the random variable generator gives “uniformly” distributed iid
quantities, then the mutual information between the HFK and the FK is zero; i.e.
given the HFK, the best thing the attacker can do is to guess the FK. We note
that this statement is true independent of whether the attacker is another key
generating member or not. Hence, another single group member cannot extract
the FK of a member i by obtaining the HFK of other members; i.e. the pad αi,j
does provide the desired randomization for the FK FKi,j for the member i at key
update time j.
We also note that in generating the HFKs, we are performing modulo addition
of two uniformly distributed rvs. None of them have any language structure.
Hence, the attacker cannot use word frequency analysis or any other language
constructs to reduce the search space.
In summary, if the r.v’s are generated as uniform and iid, then there is perfect
secrecy between the HFKs and the FKs. We also need mutual independence with
respect to the initial parameters. Under these conditions of distributions no one,
including the other key generating members, can make use of HFKi,j to extract
FKi,j.
3.11 Proofs Based on Conditional Probabilities
In this sections we show how to use probabilistic arguments to derive the secrecy
conditions satisfied by the model. In order to do that we assumed that the FK’s,
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HFK’s and the αi,j, all have the space of same size. We first note that the
proposed scheme is analogous to a two step procedure as shown below
f1(FKi,j; αi,j) = FKi,j ⊕ αi,j = HFKi,j (3.17)
f2(HFK1,j; · · ·HKFn,j; θj) = HFK1,j ⊕ · · · ⊕HFKn,j ⊕ θj
= SKj (3.18)
f3(FKi,j; SKj) = αi,j+1
θj+1 = SKj
Theorem 3.1: The fractional key based shared key generation scheme pro-
vides perfect secrecy for map fl, l = 1, 2, 3 iff FK’s are chosen uniform and the
map fl is injective.
Proof: We will give the proofs for maps f1 and f2. Note that the proof
does not really depend on the type of operation ⊕ is except for the fact that the
operation ⊕ needs to be invertible.
We can consider the function f1(.) as the encryption of “message” αi,j using
the key FKi,j to get the cipher text HFKi,j. Let’s denote FKi,j ∈ FK, HFKi,j ∈
HFK, αi,j ∈ A. Hence, for each αi,j ∈ A and HFKi,j ∈ HFK there is at least
one FKi,j ∈ FK such that f1(FKi,j, αi,j) = FKi,j ⊕ αi,j = HFKi,j and
|A| = |{f1(FKi,j, αi,j) : FKi,j ∈ FK}| ≤ |FK|. (3.19)
However, the fractional key scheme is such that |FK| = |HFK| = |α|. Hence,
|{f1(FKi,j, αi,j) : FKi,j ∈ FK}| = |FK| (3.20)
Therefore, we have shown that if FKi,j 6= ˆFKi,j then f1(FKi,j, αi,j) 6=
f1( ˆFKi,j, αi,j). Hence, for a given αi,j ∈ A and HFKi,j ∈ HFK, we have only
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one FKi,j such that f1(FKi,j, αi,j) = HFKi,j. There are |FK| possible “keys”.
Hence, given an HFK, there are |FK| possible unique mapping of each αi,j to









Perfect secrecy condition yields P (αl,i,j|HFKi,j) = P (αl,i,j). Using this we
have P (FKl,i,j) = P (HFKi,j), 1 ≤ l ≤ |FK|. This means that the “keys” are
drawn with equal probability. But since the number of “keys” is |FK|, we must
have that the FKi,j are chosen uniformly. Hence, if we have perfect secrecy for
f1(.) then we must choose the keys FK’s uniform.
Proof of the converse part: If the conditions are satisfied - namely that
the FK’s are chosen uniformly and only one set of HFK and αi,j is mapped to












The last step follows from the fact that for a given key, only one message is
assumed to be mapped to the cipher. Hence, independent of the distribution of






Hence, the system defined by function f1 has perfect secrecy. The proofs for the
function f3 is identical to that of f1. To prove that the function f2 also implies
perfect secrecy, we note that
f2(HFK1,j; · · ·HKFn,j; θj) (3.27)
= HFK1,j ⊕HFK2,j · · · ⊕HFKn,j ⊕ θj
= FKi,j ⊕ αi,j ⊕HFK2,j · · · ⊕HFKn,j ⊕ θj
= f1(FKi,j; αi,j)⊕HFK2,j · · · ⊕HFKn,j ⊕ θj
= FKi,j ⊕HFK2,j · · · ⊕HFKn,j ⊕ θj
= θj ⊕ αi,j
This can be written as
FKi,j ⊕ λi,j = f1(FKi,j;λi,j) = γi,j (3.28)
Now, for f1 we have already shown that perfect secrecy is achieved iff FKi,j
is uniformly chosen as long as only one key relates the “plain text” and the
“cipher”. Hence SKj is uniformly distributed if FKi,j is uniformly chosen and
every member makes sure that no fractional key is repeatedly used by them.
In summary, if the fractional keys are chosen uniformly and the function ⊕ is
such that only one fractional key relates a given HFK and the pad, then we have
perfect secrecy if the bit length of these quantities are same. Clearly, modulo




As noted in chapter two, there are many variations of the rooted tree based
key distributions proposed to minimize the storage at the group controller and
the members while providing a reduction in the amount of encryptions required
to update the session key [36, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 14]. Many of these tree based
schemes seem to present different optimal values for the required keys to be stored
at the GC and the user node.
We show that these methods can be analyzed in a systematic manner. We
also show that the design of an optimal tree is closely related to Huffman trees
and the entropy of member revocation event. We then show that this entropy
provides a bound on the providable key length if all the keys are of the same
length. We perform weakness analysis of some of the recent rooted tree based
schemes using entropy and show that these schemes do not scale well.
We then show how to generate a key management scheme with specific amount
of user collusion, thus generating a family of key management schemes.
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4.1 Distribution of Keys on the Tree
We reproduce the tree structure from chapter two in this section. The figure 4.1
presents a KEK distribution based on a binary rooted tree for 8 members. As
noted earlier, the leafs are in one-to-one correspondence with members. Each
node of the tree represents a key. The set of keys along the path from the root to
a particular leaf node are assigned to the member represented by that leaf node.
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Figure 4.1: The Logical Key Tree of [10, 11, 13, 15, 17]
Member revocation details were presented in chapter two and are not repro-
duced here.
The following observations can be made towards the rooted tree based key
distributions:
• Since each member is assigned logdNd
2 keys, deletion of a single member
requires logdNd
2 keys to be invalidated.
• Since there are logdNd nodes between the root and a leaf and logdN nodes
are shared with other members, and for each common node one encryption
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is required, the GC needs to perform a total of logdN encryptions.
• For a d−ary tree with depth h = logdN , the GC has to store 1+1+d+d
2+
· · ·+ dh = d(N+1)−2
(d−1) number of keys. Setting d = 2 leads to the binary tree
for which the required amount of storage works out to be 2(N+1)−2
2−1 = 2N .
This result can be independently checked by noting that a binary tree with
N leafs has 2N − 1 nodes. Hence the GC has to store the SK and (2N − 1)
KEKs, leading to 2N keys that need to be stored.
In [15, 17], binary rooted tree based key distributions which require GC to
store a total of 2 log2N keys were proposed. The generalized version of this result
requires d logdN keys to be stored at the GC. Each member needs to store only
logdNd
2 keys in this scheme. However, the number of keys to be updated remain
at logdN as in [10, 11]. Hence, at first glance, the results in [17] seem to reduce
the storage requirements for the GC by
d(N + 1)− 2
d− 1
− d logdN =
d(N + 1− (d− 1) logdN)− 2
(d− 1)
(4.1)
number of keys without increasing the key storage requirements at the end user
node.
4.2 Preliminary Observations
We first show the need to optimize the rooted-tree using a worst case example.
Let us consider the binary rooted-tree shown in figure 4.2.
Since the SK and the root key are common to all the members, they will be
invalidated each time a member is revoked. In this tree, if all the members have





















Figure 4.2: An Unbalanced Key Distribution
when a member is revoked is given by
3 + 4 + · · ·+ (N + 2) + (N + 2)
N
=




(N + 1)(N + 2)
2N
.
Hence, the average number of keys to be invalidated grows asO(N) in this model.
In rooted trees from [10, 11, 17] the number of keys to be invalidated is of order
O(logdN).
The key assignment problem in [10, 11, 17, 15, 13, 14] has been related to the
number of members alone. The number of keys per member was assigned based
on the observation that for N members logdN keys are enough for a rooted tree.
We however will show that the problem of key assignment can be related to
the physical process of member revocation and that it can be intimately related
to a suitably defined “entropy” of member revocation event. We further demon-
strate some interesting capabilities of this approach, including security weakness
analysis. In order to do develop our formulation, we first define the terminology
47
and show that the well known Kraft inequality plays a critical role in compromise
recovery.
4.2.1 Member Indexing
Let Xn−1Xn−2 · · ·X1X0 be the binary index sequence representing N users. Fol-
lowing the conventional network terminology, we call this indexing the User Index
(UID). In order for the GC to be able to revoke each member and invalidate the
keys, the GC has to store a member index and the corresponding set of keys
assigned to that member. Hence, UID for a member has to be in one-to-one
correspondence with the set of keys assigned to that member. This requirement
implies that each member should be indexed using the set of keys assigned to
that member. We now define the Key Index (KID) in the following manner.
Definition: Key Index (KID) of a member i is defined as the string generated
by concatenation of the keys assigned to the member i, taken in any order. If
the number of keys assigned to member i is denoted by Li, then there are Li!
possible different sequences that can be generated using these Li keys. All these
KIDs are equivalent. Hence, the KID of a member is an equivalence class with
Li! elements in it, where Li is the number of keys assigned to member i.
M1 in figure 4.1 has five KEKs and is represented by the stringKOK2.1K1.1K0.1.
Since there are 120 different ways to concatenate these keys, there are 119 addi-
tional strings generated by rearranging and concatenating the keys assigned to
M1.
Use of UID alone as in [10, 11, 15, 17] doesn’t provide insights into the prob-
lems due to user collusion. The discussions on user collusion are presented in a
later section due to its separate significance.
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4.2.2 Unique Key Set Assignment and Kraft Inequality
At the time of member revocation, the GC has to be able to uniquely identify
the set of keys assigned to the revoked member and invalidate the keys. After
revoking a member, securely reaching the rest of the group requires that the
valid member has one or more keys that are not in the set of keys assigned to the
revoked member. We will call the ability of the GC to reach the valid members
under some user(s) revocation as the reachability condition. Unlike other works
that emphasize UID, we note that the KID plays a major role since it is the keys
that need to be invalidated and (re)generated.
One important necessary condition for reachability to hold in the rooted tree
based key assignment is that the KID of any member should not be a prefix of the
KID of any other member. On the rooted-tree, this leads to the well known Kraft
inequality given below.
Theorem 4.1. Kraft Inequality for KID
For a d − ary rooted key tree with N members and KIDs satisfying the prefix
condition, if we denote the number of keys for member i by li, the sequence
{l1, l2, · · · lN} satisfies the Kraft inequality given by
i=N∑
i=1
d−li ≤ 1. (4.3)
Conversely, given a set of numbers {l1, l2, · · · lN} satisfying this inequality,
there is a rooted tree that can be constructed such that each member has a
unique KID with no-prefixing.
Proof: Presented in [1], and is not included here.
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4.2.3 Limitations of Kraft Inequality
We now show why the Kraft inequality is only a necessary condition for reachabil-
ity. Let A, B, and C be three members who have been assigned keys {K1, K2, K3},
{K1, K2, K3, K5, K6}, and {K4, K5, K6} respectively. For a binary tree these
lengths satisfy the Kraft inequality since (2−3 + 2−5 + 2−3) = 9
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< 1. We note
that if the member B is revoked, all the keys of member A are completely inval-
idated whereas the keys of member B will be only partially invalidated. If, on
the other hand, member A is revoked, the GC can securely reach members B and
C using any one of the keys from the set {K5, K6}. However, if the GC has to
revoke members A and C simultaneously, all the keys of member B will be com-
promised. Although the set of keys assigned to member B is not a concatenation
of keys of members A and C, all the keys assigned to B are contained in the set
of keys assigned to members A and C. Hence, the condition that the KID of a
member should not be a prefix for the KID of another member is not a sufficient
condition for reachability. Moreover, this example shows that the choice of KIDs
satisfying the Kraft inequality does not imply that the KID system is collusion
resistant.
On the other hand, the KIDs satisfying the Kraft inequality do help to solve
another important problem, namely the optimal key allocation per member. We
present the needed formulation in the next section. This optimal assignment
is very closely tied to the underlying physical process of member revocation as
shown in the next section.
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4.3 Probabilistic Modeling of Member Revoca-
tion
Since the key updates are performed in response to member revocation, statistics
of member revocation event, are useful data for system design and performance
characterization. Hence, the statistics of member revocation should be linked to
the assignment of KID to a member. It may be noted that we are not making
any claim about the specific selection of any key at this stage. We denote by pi
the probability of revocation of member i.
4.3.1 Relating the Probability of Member Revocation to
the Keys on the Rooted Tree
The physical process of member revocation is related to the rooted trees via the
leaf nodes using the following observations.
• Since each member in the rooted tree is assigned to a unique leaf, the prob-
ability of revocation of a member is equal to the probability of revocation
of the corresponding leaf node.
• Since all the nodes of the rooted tree are assigned a unique key,the proba-
bility of revocation of leaf node is also the probability of revocation of the
key represented by the leaf node.
• Hence, we note that the probability pi of revoking member i is equivalent
to having the probability pi of revoking the key at the leaf i.
We can also derive additional properties that are more useful on the trees.
For example, although the probability of revocation of any intermediate node key
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is a composition of the probabilities of all the children nodes, the KIDs are sets
uniquely associated with each member. Hence, the probability of revocation of a
member is identical to not only the revocation of the leaf node key, but also the
revocation of the set of keys assigned to that member, taken together as a set.
The individual revocation probabilities of the keys may be different, and can be
computed using basic formulae with some realistic assumptions.
The following assumptions are implicit in the models presented in [10, 17, 15]
and are useful in the derivation of the optimal number of keys to be assigned to
each member.
• Assumption 1: Revocation of members are mutually independent events.
• Assumption 2: The number of members N is a fixed quantity.
This assumption is restrictive and can at best satisfy only one temporal “snap
shot” of the real world requirement. Implicit in this assumption is the property
that the tree structure is fixed over the entire session. One way to remove this
constraint is to set N as the maximal allowed number of members. In deriving
the optimal number of keys to be assigned per member, we will assume that N
represents the number of members in the group.
The assumption that the member revocation events are independent allows
a simple computation of the probabilities of revocation of all the intermediate
node keys on the tree. Let the branch k of an intermediate node i have the prob-
ability of revocation pik. If the individual member revocations are statistically
independent, the following equation presents the probability of revocation pi of






Hence, starting from the revocation probabilities of the leaf nodes, one can
compute the probabilities of revocation of all the intermediate nodes. Using
the recursive nature of the rooted tree structure, every probability of revocation
of any key corresponding to an internal node can be expressed in terms of the
probabilities of the member revocation. In particular, the the root key and the
session key are revoked every time a member is revoked.
4.3.2 Defining the Entropy of Member Revocation Event
In physical processes that involve probabilistic modeling, one can often define the
uncertainty of the occurrence of an event using a suitably defined entropy of the
process. We will use Shannon entropy [1] to express the amount of uncertainty
as to which member will be revoked. We first define the entropy of member
revocation event.





pi logd pi (4.5)
where pi is the probability of revocation of member i. As mentioned earlier, the
entropy expresses the uncertainty as to which member will be revoked in d− ary
digits.
Since the member revocation event and the leaf node key revocation event
are probabilistically identical, the entropy of the member revocation event is the
same as the entropy of the leaf key revocation event.
Leaf Key Revocation Entropy: is the entropy or uncertainty as to which of the
leaf keys will be revoked. Since the leaf key revocation probability is in one-to-one
correspondence with the member revocation probabilities, the leaf key revocation
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entropy is identical to the entropy of the member revocation event.
Hereafter we will use the term entropy of member revocation event instead
of leaf key revocation entropy since they are equivalent. Another very useful
observation is that since the member revocation event is also probabilistically
equivalent to the KID revocation event, the entropy of member revocation event
is identical to the entropy of the KID revocation event.
A main outcome of these observations is that the entropy of the KID revocation
event is identical to, and can be completely characterized by the entropy of the
leaf key revocation event (which is equivalent to the member revocation event).
With this probabilistic model, we show below that we can:
• Derive optimal number of keys per member.
• Analyze the collusion properties of some schemes.
• Derive a bound on the length of the keys.
• Determine if a given rooted key scheme can sustain its key generation rates
4.3.3 Assigning Optimal Number of Keys per Member
Since the SK and the root key are common to all the members, these two keys do
not contribute to the optimization. We now show that the optimal key assignment
on the rooted tree can be posed as an optimization problem.
Theorem 4.2. For a key assignment satisfying the Kraft inequality, the
optimal average number of keys, excluding the root key and the SK, held by a
member is given by the d − ary entropy Hd = −
∑i=N
i=1 pi logd pi of the member
revocation event. For a member i with probability of revocation pi, satisfying this
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optimality, the optimal number of keys li, excluding the root key and the TEK,
is given by
li
∗ = − logd pi. (4.6)
Proof:





Then the constrained problem is to minimize l̂, subject to the constraint of the
Kraft inequality given by
N∑
i=1
d−li ≤ 1. (4.8)








where λ is Lagrange multiplier, and
∑N
i=1 d




= pi − λd
−li log d (4.10)
where “log” with no base denotes the natural logarithm. Setting the derivative
to zero, yields the optimal value of li as
pi = d
−l∗i λ log d (4.11)









= λd−li(log d)2 = δi,jpi log d ≥ 0; (4.15)
where, δi,j =

1 if i = j
0 if i 6= j
Since the second partials are positive, the optimal values of li’s correspond
to a global minimum value of the cost function C. Using the convexity of the
cost function, this minima is indeed the global minimum of the cost function C.
Hence, optimization of LKT provides the minimal number of average keys per













where Hd = −
∑i=N
i=1 pi logd pi is the entropy of the member revocation event.
Since the SK and the root key are common to all the members, optimal average
number of keys per member is given by Hd + 2, and the number of keys assigned
to member i with revocation probability pi, including the SK and the root key is
given by





The following properties that are very useful in identification of the minimal
number of keys that can be used after member revocation are summarized in the
form of the lemma below; the are also satisfied by the optimal number of keys
held by a member.
Lemma 4.1.
1. If pi > pj, then li(= − logd pi) > lj(= − logd pj).
2. There must be at least two members with the largest number of keys.
3. Since the number of keys assigned per member needs to be integer, true
average number of keys per member is more than the optimal value, and is
not more than d additional keys.
In order to derive the last part of the lemma, we need the following definition
from information theory [1].
Definition: The relative entropy or the Kullback Leibler distance between








Sketch of the Proofs:
1. The logarithm being a monotone function, if pi > pj, then logd pi > logd pj .
Hence − logd pi < − logd pj , leading to li(= − logd pi) < lj(= − logd pj).
2. If there are no two members with the largest number of keys, then we can
reduce the largest number of keys held by at least one and still ensure that
all members have unique sets of keys assigned. However this reduction will
violate the proof of optimality of the individual codeword lengths. Hence,
at least two members should be assigned largest number of keys.
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3. In the earlier derivation we showed that the entropy is the point of opti-
mality, and is indeed a global minimum of the average number of keys held
by a member. Since the number of keys need to be integer, the average


















































−li ≤ 1, we have 1∑i=N
i=1
d−li





To show that the term D(p||q) ≥ 0, we need the following known lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Let {ai}i=Ni=1 , and {bi}
i=N















with equality being achieved iff ai
bi
= constant.
Proof: Let y = log t. Then the tangent to the curve y at point (t′, log t′) is




. Except at the point of tangent, the
curve y = log t is below the line y = t−t
′
t′
+ log t′. At the point of tangent,
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we have t = t′. Setting t = bi
ai
















































































































is the probability which optimizes the average number of keys assigned per
member.
In summary, the optimal key allocation strategy requires that the member
with revocation probability pi be assigned logd
d2
pi
number of keys. In the case of
binary rooted trees, the optimal number of keys for a member with probability




The results indicating that there are at least two members with the largest
KID also indicate that the tree is packed. i.e., if a member is revoked, all the
complementary keys of that member are needed to securely reach the rest of the
members. If there are bulk member removals, the set of keys that are in the
complementary set of the revoked members can be used to securely update the
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valid members. Depending on the nature of the specific key choices it is possible
to develop a fast algorithm for key updates.
4.3.4 Maximum Entropy and the Key Assignment
The results reported in [10, 11, 13, 17, 15] present rooted trees with all member
having the same number of keys. Since the optimal number of keys for a member i
with probability of revocation pi is logd
d2
pi




= constant for all values of i. Hence, the results in [10, 11, 17, 15,
13] assume that the probability of revocation is uniform for the entire group.
Since the uniform distribution maximizes the entropy and entropy is the average
number of keys per member under the optimal strategy, the schemes in [10, 11, 13]
assign maximal set of keys per member. We summarize these results by the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Since the entropy of member revocationHd = −
∑i=N
i=1 pi logd pi
is maximized when the revocation probabilities are uniform and the schemes
in [10, 11, 17, 15, 13] implicitly assume uniform member revocation probabilities,
these schemes correspond to the worst case key assignments for individual mem-
bers. These schemes assign logdNd
2 keys per member, where N is the group
size.
We note here that the use of maximal number of keys per member does not
imply that the key distribution scheme is free of any possible member collusion or
even secure. We elaborate on this point later. Next we derive the explicit bounds
on the optimal number of keys per member.
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4.3.5 Upper Bounds on the Integer Values of keys
The optimal number of keys for a member with probability of revocation pi in a





Since this quantity corresponds to the number of physical keys, it has to be
an integer value. The following theorem summarizes the bound on the optimal
number of keys to be held by a member. If we denote the integer value of the
average number of keys, excluding the SK and the root key, held by members
by l̂∗, the bounds on the optimal number of keys per member are given by the
following inequalities
Theorem 4.4. The optimal average number of keys held by a member sat-
isfies
Hd + 2 ≤ l̂
∗ + 2 < Hd + 3. (4.30)
Proof: Using the notation d− logd pie to represent the smallest integer
greater than or equal to − logd pi, we have the integer value of l
∗
i as
l∗i = d− logd pie. (4.31)
For this choice of li, we have









i=−d− logd pie) ≤
i=N∑
i=1
d− logd pi =
i=N∑
i=1
pi = 1. (4.33)
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⇒ Hd ≤ l̂
∗ < Hd + 1 (4.35)
⇒ Hd + 2 ≤ l̂
∗ + 2 < Hd + 3 (4.36)
Since the average number of keys per member is (l̂∗ + 2), we note that the
optimal number of average keys per member is at most 3 d − ary digits more,
and is at least 2 d− ary digits more than the entropy of the member revocation
event.
4.3.6 Effect of Using Incorrect Entropy on Key Length
In figure 4.2 we presented the effect of an unbalanced rooted tree on the number
of keys to be assigned and to be invalidated. We note that this quantity can be
completely characterized using basic results from information theory as well.
Lets us assume that the true revocation probability of member i is pi and the
used probability of revocation for member i is qi. Hence, the optimal number of
keys to be assigned to that member is given by
l∗i = d− logd qie (4.37)
Using an incorrect distribution introduces redundancy in the number of keys
that are assigned to the members. This redundancy is given by the following
theorem.
Theorem 5. The average number of keys per member under the true dis-
tribution p with the number of key selection based on l = − logd qi satisfies the
following bounds
Hd(p) +D(p||q) ≤ L < Hd(q) +D(p||q) + 1. (4.38)
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= D(p||q) + 1
= L < Hd(p) +D(p||q) + 1.

















= L < Hd(p) +D(p||q).
Hence, on average the number of redundant keys assigned to a member due
to the use of an incorrect distribution is given by the inequalities (4.38).
Apart from being closely related to the optimal key assignments, the entropy
of member revocation event is also related to the sustainable key length of the
secure multicast group, as shown next. To our knowledge, result of this kind is
not available in the literature of key length selection.
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4.3.7 Bounds on Average Key Length
When there is a member revocation, the average number of keys to be invalidated
is given by (2 + Hd). If each key is L digits long, then in order to update these
keys, the total number of digits that need to be generated by the GC after member
revocation is L(2 + Hd) digits. Since Hd ≤ logdN with equality attained iff all
the members have equal revocation probabilities, the hardware need to be able to
generate an average of L logd(Nd
2) digits within the next unit of time of update
to let the session continue. The following theorem summarizes this result.
Theorem 4.6. For a d−ary rooted tree key distribution scheme in which each
key is of length L digits, if the hardware digit generation rate is given by B, then
the key length is bounded above by L ≤ B
Hd+2
on average and the maximally
allowable key length is bounded by L ≤ B
logd(Nd
2)
. Considering individual mem-









Proof: As shown earlier, the average number of keys to be generated in the
event of member revocation is given by (2 +Hd) = 2 +
∑i=N
i=1 pili . Hence, the
hardware should be able to generate a total of L(Hd+2) digits of suitable quality
1
in unit of time to let the session continue without delays in the average sense.
Hence the hardware digit generation rate B must satisfy B ≥ L(Hd+2). Observ-
ing that the entropy is maximal under uniform distribution and the maximal value





iff all the members have the same revocation probabilities. The minimal and
maximal allowed key lengths are decided by the maximal and the minimal mem-










Since it is of interest to make sure that the system sustains the secure com-
1Based on the application specific use of the key.
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munication mode, one strategy is to design the system so that it satisfies the
worst case scenario. Hence the hardware digit generation rate B needs to satisfy




In summary, it was shown that the entropy of member revocation event plays
an important role in deciding the key length if the system were to update the
keys each time a member is revoked.
4.4 Security Analysis of Recent Results Using
Member Revocation Entropy
The authors in [15] noted that given the binary index of a member, each bit in
the index takes two values, namely 0 or 1. To follow the example given in [15],
when N = 16, log2 16 = 4 bits are needed to uniquely index all 16 members.
The authors then proceeded to claim that since each bit takes two values, it can
be symbolically mapped to a distinct pairs of keys. The table below reproduces
the mapping between the ID bit # and the key mapping for the case in [15] for
N = 8:
ID Bit #0 K0.0 K0.1
ID Bit #1 K1.0 K1.1
ID Bit #2 K2.0 K2.1
where, the key pair (Ki,0, Ki,1) symbolically represents the two possible values of
the ith bit of the member index. Although this table does provides a one-to-one
mapping between the set of keys and the member index using only eight keys,
the problem with this approach becomes clear if we map the table to the rooted
tree structure. Figure 2 shows the mapping of the keys on the tree. (For the
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sake of clarity, not all the keys corresponding to the leafs are shown in figure 2).
Adjacent leafs have K20, K21 as the keys and this pair is repeated across the level.
In fact, at any depth only two specific keys have been used and duplicated across
the depth.
In approaches such as [17, 15] that use UID to optimal Huffman coding, a
special case of member revocation brings these key management schemes to halt,
by collusion. This happens if the members M0 and M7 need to be revoked. The
corresponding keys to be revoked are shown in figure 4.3. These two members
have only the session key in common. However, if these two members need to
be simultaneously revoked, the group controller is left with no key to securely
communicate with the rest of the valid members. This reduces the rooted tree
to the GKMP [7]. The compromise recovery for this case requires that the entire
group re-key itself by contacting one member at a time.
The key assignments in [17, 15] and their variations also allow the members
to collaborate or collude and break the system. We now discuss user collusion on
the rooted tree in [17, 15].
4.4.1 Impact of Member Collusion on Rooted Trees
We showed that if more than one member were to be revoked, the whole key
scheme may be compromised. There are three different ways to interpret the
collusion problems with approaches in [15, 17] based on rooted trees. We present
them in the order of generality:
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M M M M M M MM0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10K K11 11
 20  21
Figure 4.3: The Key Distribution in [17, 15]
Interpretation based on Minimal number of Key Requirements
A simple way to interpret the shortcomings of the results in [15, 17] is to note that
2 log2N < N , if N > 4. In order to prevent member collusion from being able to
break the rest of the system, there must be at least N keys so that each member
has a unique key and can be contacted at the time of member revocation. Since
2 log2N < N (for N > 4) is the number of distinct keys used by the variation
of rooted tree presented in [15, 17], such a scheme can be completely or partially
compromised depending on the colluding members. However, when N = 4,
2 log2N = 4. Hence, in order to be able to reach any valid members securely, the
key distribution has to be a degenerate multicast as shown in figure 4.4.
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M M M M M M MM0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10K K11 11
 20  21
Figure 4.4: Revocation of Members M0, M7 in [15, 17].
Interpretation Based on Complementary variables
The third interpretation is based on the notion of sets and includes a larger
definition of collusion discussed under the category of complementary variables
in [10]. The approach in [15, 17] is a special case of the complementary variable
approach. If the secure group membership is a set such that every member is
denoted by a unique key and that key is given to all other members but the
member itself, at the time the member is to be revoked, all other members can
use the key denoting the revoked member as the new key. For a set of N members,
all the members will have (N − 1) keys that correspond to other members and
no member will have the key denoting itself. Clearly, if two members collude,
between them they will have all the future keys of the group. Hence, this kind of
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key assignment does not scale beyond 2 members.
Interpretation based on Huffman Coding
We showed that the average number of keys per member is given by entropy. We
also showed that if the distribution is uniform, the average number of keys per
member attains its maximum value. When the member revocation probabilities
are equal, the number of keys assigned to a member is same as the average number
of keys per member. We also showed that this strategy is used in [10, 11, 17, 15].
The schemes in [15, 17] mapped the UIDs to KIDs directly. Since the number
of bits needed for N members is log2N , the schemes in [15, 17] used a unique
pair of keys to symbolically map each bit position of the the member index.
Hence, a total of 2 log2N keys are used to uniquely represent each member index.
This selection of keys can create a set of N unique indices and the codewords
generated by concatenating log2N keys satisfy the Kraft inequality. Hence, this
mapping of a unique pair of keys to each bit location corresponds to performing
a Huffman coding with 2H2(U) distinct keys, where H2(U) = log2N . However,
the problem with Huffman coding is that it is uniquely decodable!. Hence, a key
assignment based on direct mapping of bit location to keys will lead to serious
security exposure. In fact, an attacker can break the whole system by breaking the
members whose indices are all ones and all zeros. These two members represent
all possible bit patterns and hence have all the 2 log2N keys among themselves.
If we use the notation (kj , k̂j) to denote the unique key pair representing the
two possible binary values taken by the jth bit, we note that the collusion or
compromise of two members holding keys kj and k̂j respectively will compro-
mise the integrity of the key pair (kj, k̂j). The following lemmas summarize our
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observations:
Lemma 4.3. If the binary rooted key tree uses Optimal Huffman Coding
for assigning members a set of keys based on 2 log2N (N > 4) ( here N is
dyadic) distinct keys as in [15, 17], the whole system can be broken if any two
members whose “codewords” (and hence indices) are one’s complement of each
other collude or are compromised. Hence, the integrity systems in [15, 17] do not
scale beyond 4 members in the presence of colluding members.
In a D − ary tree, each digit takes D values and the sum of these values is
given by D(D−1)
2
. Hence, if a set of k (k ≥ D) members whose ith bit values when
summed lead to D(D−1)
2
collude, they will be able to fully compromise the ith bit
location. This result is summarized by:
Lemma 4.4. For a D − ary tree with N members, the key corresponding
to bit location b will be compromised by a subset of k (k ≥ D) members whose
symbolic value of the bit location b denoted by the set {b1, b2, · · · , bk} satisfy




4.4.2 On Generating a Large Class of Key Management
Schemes with Varying Degree of Collusion
From our analysis of the tree based schemes, we note that many different key
management schemes with different levels of protection against the user collusion
can be made. On one extreme, the keys representing the rooted tree have no
relationship, leading to a very high degree of integrity but also higher storage
requirements. On the other extreme, all members share the same keys as in
GKMP [7] leading to the system failure in the event of a single member failure.
The schemes in [15, 17] fail with the collusion of two members or can fail at
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different bit level depending on the index of the colluding members. Depending
on how many digit locations are represented as k − ary digits. The figure 4.5
shows the comparison between various schemes.
1 2 k N
GKMP
Degenerate Multicast -N unicast
 mapped to key index
A binary Tree with all the bits  of user index 
Schemes with varying 
Degree of collusion
A k-ary Tree with one digit of user index 
mapped to key index
Compromise the Integrity of the Entire System
Minimal Number of Members Needed to Fail in order to
Figure 4.5: Effect of User failure of different schemes
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Chapter 5
Oneway Functions for Keys
The previous chapter dealt with the design and analysis of rooted tree based key
distribution schemes that will optimize the key storage requirements and commu-
nication overhead. In doing so, no assumption was made about the mechanism
by which the keys are regenerated or distributed to the group.
In the recent past, there have been attempts making use of cryptographically
strong functions to further reduce the amount of computations and the key storage
requirements at the GC. In particular, McGrew and Sherman [14] proposed a
rooted tree based key distribution approach that can deal with member join
or removal based on properties of oneway functions. Canetti coauthored two
papers which relied on the cryptographic strength of pseudo random functions
and provided (a) efficient key update [13] under member removal, and (b) efficient
communication key storage requirement [16] with sub-linear storage requirements.
In [16] Canetti et al. stated that the optimality or the lack of it for their
scheme was not provable in the paper and posed it as an open problem. We
resolve it by showing that the storage provided by them is not optimal and that
it is a specific point along a cost function that is a hyperbola. We also show
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that the worst case optimal strategy is related to maximum entropy even under
their setup. This result, though obvious from the elementary information theory
point of view, shows that while clustering members into groups, the worst case
optimal strategy is to group members of the clusters so that the uncertainty as
to which cluster will need key update should be roughly equal. We now present
the current approaches and analyze them
5.1 Oneway function tree of McGrew and Sher-
man
McGrew and Sherman modified the rooted tree of Wallner et al [10] using oneway
functions for explicitly computing the updated keys of the members. In order to
illustrate their approach, we consider a rooted binary tree of depth three. This
tree supports eight members and is shown in figure 5.1. The member M3 is being
revoked and the key update for member M4 using oneway functions approach
of McGrew and Sherman [14] is demonstrated here. In this scheme, each node
n is associated with two keys, a node key kn and a blinded node key k
′
n. The




In order to generate the blinded node keys, the GC chooses fresh random
keys and assigns a unique key to each leaf node. Since each leaf node is assigned
to a unique member, the leaf key is also the individual member key. From the
previous chapter, we note that the entropy of member revocation is same as the
entropy of the leaf key revocation. The internal node key for node n is computed
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blinded keys known to M4






Figure 5.1: Key Update Process in [14].
using the formula
kn = f(g(kleft(n)), g(kright(n))) (5.1)
where f is a mixing function, g is a one-way function, kleft(n) and kright(n) are the
keys of the left and the right children of node n. For example, f can be an XOR
function.
McGrew and Sherman’s construction requires that the following invariant is
preserved by the key generation procedure
System Invariant. Every member knows the unblinded node keys of all the
nodes on the path from its leaf to the root, blinded node keys that are siblings to
its path to the root, and no other blinded or unblinded keys.
The intermediate keys are computed using the following steps.
• Every member is given its leaf key, and all the relevant sibling blinded node
keys.
• Every member independently computes its blinded keys of the nodes along
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the path to the root.
• Every member computes the relevant internal node keys.
If any of the blinded key changes, then the corresponding siblings should be
updated with the new blinded key.
5.1.1 Computations under Addition or Deletion of Mem-
bers
When a member is deleted or revoked, the node keys and the blinded node keys
along the path from the leaf assigned to the member to the root are invalidated.
If n is a node for which the blinded node key and the node key were revoked,
and m is the sibling(s) of n, all the descendants of m need to be given the new
blinded node key of n. If the member deletion or revocation leaves only one child
for a parent, the child member is moved up to the parent node.
If a new member is added to a node n, node n is split, and two children are
generated. In order to prevent any other member from colluding and compro-
mising the keys, the new children leafs are given new set of leaf keys. All the
relevant blinded keys are given to the members whose path from their leafs to
the root are sibling to the newly created node path.
5.1.2 Summary of McGrew-Sherman Approach
Although the approach proposed by McGrew and Sherman can reduce the amount
of communication overhead at the GC, the security of the new key generation
scheme can’t be proven rigorously or reduced to the security of any primitive.
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However, we do note that at this stage there doesn’t seem to be any obvious
weakness in the scheme either.
An alternate method proposed by Canetti et al can be used to update the
keys when a member is revoked and is described below.
5.2 Worst Case Member Revocation
We again consider a binary tree of depth three. This tree can support a group
of eight members. In order to illustrate the method, we consider the case of
revoking member M1. Figure 5.2 illustrates the revocation of M1. The keys
{KO, K2.1, K1.1, K0.1} are to be invalidated while revoking member M1, and the
keys {KO, K2.1, K1.1} need to be updated for the relevant members. From the
figure 5.2, a member Mi needs to update the keys corresponding to the internal
nodes that are common to Mi and M1. For example, members M5,M6,M7,M8
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Figure 5.2: Deletion of M1 in Rooted-Tree of [10].
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As noted earlier, the tree structure allows the GC to update multiple members
simultaneously. In figure 5.3, members that can be grouped together are marked.
In [10], update of the keys is shown along the tree. As before, we use the notation
{m}K to denote the encryption of message m using the key K. In removing M1,
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Figure 5.3: Key Update After revocation of M1 [10].
The number of encryption needed is given by 2 logN for the binary tree with
depth logN . We now present the method by Canetti et al [13], that reduces the
communication overhead to logN instead of 2 logN .
5.3 A Scheme for Reducing Communication Over-
head
In [13], Canetti et al presented an efficient key update method based on pseudo-
random functions. The security of their scheme can be reduced to the strength or
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the security of the pseudo-random function used in the computation. We describe
their method below. Description of the method can also be found in [13, 16].
Figure 5.4 shows the type of update performed using the pseudo-random
function. In order to prevent any obvious security weakness, the pseudo-random
function G(.) is chosen so that it doubles the size of the input. The output string
is then split into two strings of equal length, denoted as L(.), and R(.). If the
input is denoted by x, then G(x) = L(x)R(x), where L(x) and R(x) are the left
and right strings of the output.
When a member is to be revoked, the GC chooses a secret key or a random
seed r, and assigns it to the parent node of the leaf node to which the revoked
member was assigned. Every internal node n along the path from the root to
the leaf assigned to the revoked member is assigned a unique fresh value rn. The
values of rn, and the relevant node keys are computed in a recursive manner from
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Figure 5.4: Key update process using pseudo-random functions [13].
Without loss of generality, we illustrate the update procedure for revocation
of M1.
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1. The GC chooses a fresh random quantity r, encrypts, and sends {r}K02 to
M2.
2. The member M2 computes G(r) = L(r)R(r), and locally computes the
parent node key K
′
11 = L(r).
3. The GC then encrypts R(r), and send {R(r)}K12 to M3 and M4.






5. The GC then encrypts and distributes R(R(r)) to M5- M8 as {R(R(r))}K22.
6. All the members can now compute the root key as K
′
O = L(R(R(r))).
We note that the algorithm can be generalized to a d − ary tree without
difficulty.
The general procedure for revoking M1 is summarized (any encryption and
distribution is assumed to be done by the GC only)
1. Choose a fresh random quantity r and assign it to the leaf node that is
revoked.
2. Encrypt and distribute the value of r to the siblings of the revoked member.
3. For i = 0 · · ·h, (h is the depth of the tree) repeat all the steps below.
4. Compute G(Ri(r)) = L(Ri)(Ri+1).






6. Encrypt and distribute {Ri(r)}Ki2 to members who need that value, and
have not been provided with any value earlier.
Invoking the properties in [33], it was noted that G(.) being a pseudo-random
function, repeated applications of it to the input r will make it difficult for the
GC to set the root key to be from the weak key space. i.e., if G(.) is pseudo-
random, output of Gl(r) is difficult to predict. Hence, iff G(x) = L(x)R(x) is
a cryptographically strong pseudo-random function generator, it will be hard to
choose k such that k = L(R · · · (r) · · ·). Canetti et al. claimed that this property
of the pseudo-random functions will prevent the GC from choosing weak keys.
We note that the argument assumes that the initial key assignment doesn’t include
any weak keys. Else, the computation of the keys along the tree is somewhat
complicated than that is presented by Canetti et al.
5.3.1 Use of Pseudo-random Functions in Storage Reduc-
tion
The GC can minimize the key storage requirements by generating the member
specific keys as outputs of a pseudo-random function with indexing. In this
scheme [16], the GC holds a single secret key r, an index to a pseudo-random
function fr [16]. The leaf key of member Mi is generated by ki = fr(i). When
a user is compromised, the GC computes the new session key SK, encrypts the
new SK with the individual keys of each valid member and distributes. The
security of this key generation scheme is based on the security of the pseudo-
random function and the encryption scheme used. For security reasons, if a
single member is compromised, the whole membership has to be updated with
communication overhead of O(N).
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On the other hand, the rooted trees need only O(logN) communication mes-
sages to be used to update the keys. Hence, a mix model of key distribution was
proposed in [16] to minimize the key storage requirements at GC. In this model,
the group is divided into clusters of size M . Each cluster is assigned to a unique
leaf of a d − ary tree. Within the clusters, a cluster specific pseudo-random
function is used to generate member specific leaf keys.
The model can be summarized in the following steps: Given a group of size
N ,
1. form clusters with fixed size M .
2. build a a− ary rooted-tree with depth




3. assign each cluster to a unique leaf node of the a−ary rooted-tree of depth,
denoted by b.
4. use a pseudo-random function generator with cluster specific seed and gen-
erate the member specific keys.
Once the a − ary rooted-tree of depth b is constructed, the key distribution is
done using the technique in [10].
Communication-Storage Parameters Using the minimal storage scheme in con-
junction with the rooted-tree, the user storage, the GC storage, and the number
of encryptions needed can be computed analytically. We present the results with
two specific examples in the table below.
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) n0.5 + 1
Encryptions (M − 1) + (a− 1) loga(
N
M
) O(log n) 2n0.5 − 2
Table 5.1: Parameters of the tradeoff scheme in [16]. Setting a = 2, M = 1 leads
to results in [10]. In example 1, a = 2, m = O(log n), in example 2, a = m = n0.5
5.3.2 Problem Posed
Canetti et al noted that the choice of M = logN led to the key storage require-
ment O( n
logaN
) which is sub-linear in N . They conjectured [16] to be optimal
with communication overhead of O(logN), and posed it as an open problem.
5.3.3 Answer to the Problem
We note that the answer to the open problem is NO. Proof that the choice of
M they proposed does not lead to minimum storage can be presented using the
following direct computations. The total number of keys to be stored by the
GC. The key distribution structure in [16] has an a− ary rooted-tree with depth
b followed by a cluster of M members at each leafs. The total number of keys












Setting a = 2, M = 1 leads to the familiar result in [10] for a binary rooted-
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tree in the case that it has (2n -1) keys excluding the SK. The general form of





where λ, µ are scalar constants.
The result of sub-linear storage was derived in [16] by setting M = logN .
Since the storage function is a hyperbola, we note that the selection M = logN
doesn’t necessarily yield the minimal point. If the group size N is sufficiently
large, then there are plenty of values of M in the range logN < M ≤ N that
will require less key storage than that for the choice of M = logN . We present
numerical examples in a tabular manner for a binary tree (a = 2). For this case
the storage function reduces to N−M
M
.
N logN Range for improved results
210 10 10 < M ≤ N
215 15 15 < M ≤ N
220 20 20 < M ≤ N
5.3.4 Further Improvement to the Cluster Based Tech-
niques
We note that the solution presented by Canetti et al need not be optimal in
a heterogeneoous network with non-uniform member revocation probabilities.
If the member revocation probabilities are non-uniform, using the modeling in
the previous section, and assuming that the individual member revocation event
are independent, for cluster i, the probability of revocation of the cluster is the
sum of the probabilities of the revocation of the cluster members. Using these
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probabilities, we can define the entropy of cluster revocation in a similar manner
as the entropy of member revocation. Moreover, given the individual cluster
revocation probabilities, we can solve the problem of optimal number of keys per
cluster for the a−ary rooted tree using an identical derivation as in the previous
chapter.
We summarize the results without repeating the proofs. Since the set of KEKs
assigned to a cluster should be unique, and the KEKs are distributed on the nodes
of the tree, the unique indexing requires that the number of keys assigned to a
cluster should satisfy the Kraft inequality [20, 21]. Denoting the number of keys
assigned to a cluster with probability of revocation pi by li, we note
N∑
j=1
a−li ≤ 1. (5.6)
Minimization of the average number of keys held by a member with the unique
indexing leads to the solution that the optimal number of keys assigned to a
cluster with revocation probability pi is given by li = − loga pi. The following
theorem summarizes the optimal number of keys per cluster.
Theorem 5.1. For a rooted-tree based key assignment that satisfies the Kraft
inequality, the optimal average number of keys, excluding the root key and the
SK, assigned to a cluster is given by the a − ary entropy Ha = −
∑N
i=1 pi logd pi
of the member revocation event. For a cluster i with probability of revocation pi,
satisfying the optimization criteria, the optimal number of keys li, excluding the
root key and the SK, is given by




pi logd pi. (5.8)
In order to design the system for worst case condition, from the view point
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of the GC, the uncertainty as to which cluster is to be revoked next should be
maximized subject to the condition
∑N










In this formulation, the aim is to find the set of optimal values to each cluster
revocation probabilities.
The optimal result is the well known uniform distribution for each cluster
revocation probabilities, and the corresponding entropy is the maximal entropy
given by logdN . Hence, the cluster size should be selected such that the revoca-
tion probabilities of each of the cluster is identical. If all the members have same
probability of being revoked, the cluster size will also be the same. This though
is only a special case. Hence, the results in [16] for key storage can be further




This dissertation addresses key generation and key distribution problems for a
single sender-multiple receiver model of secure multicast. Commercial applica-
tions such as stock quote distribution and selective new updates belong to the
single sender- multiple receiver model.
A new key generation scheme was proposed that allows a set of mutually
suspicious members to generate a common secret. The scheme also lets the
members generate the common secret without having to expose their individual
secrets. In this scheme, we assumed that there is a third party to initiate the key
generation procedure. Every key generating member is given an initial pad and
a group binding parameter that is the sum of all the pads. Members generate
individual shares called fractional keys, use the individual pads to create a hidden
fractional keys, and exchange the hidden fractional keys. Every member then
combines the hidden fractional shares to generate the hidden common key/secret.
The group binding parameter is then used to remove the combined effect of all the
pads, and extract the new common key/secret. We also provided a mechanism
to update the pads of individual members. The common key/secret, which is
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the sum of individual shares, is the group binding parameter. Hence, the group
binding parameter is updated every time the group keys are computed. Although
we presented the key generation scheme for an additive law, variations such as
using a multiplicative law for combining the individual secrets are also possible.
In the second part of the thesis, a new approach to key distribution was
proposed that made use of basic concepts from information theory. In doing so,
we also showed that the best, or optimal, strategy that minimizes the number of
keys to be stored while minimizing the number of updated messages as well, is
equivalent to the optimal selection of codeword length. We further showed that
the solution obtained using concepts from information theory does not prevent
collusion. This point is demonstrated by considering the recent proposal by
researchers at IBM corporation [17], and showing that their results correspond
to optimal selection of codeword length selection but lead to member collusion.
We also presented the condition that prevents user collusion from compromising
a valid member. We then showed that the use of entropy also allows one to
group members into clusters with each cluster having equal probability of being
revoked. We also showed that it is possible to find the optimal key assignment
in the cluster case based on entropy of cluster revocation event.
There are many interesting problems and directions of future research arising
from the work presented here.
First and foremost, the results need to be extended to the case of many
senders and many receivers which represents all possible multicast applications.
Specifically we plan to pursue the following problems: authentication without
reducing performance in multicasting; group key generation and distribution;
handling membership across groups. What are the appropriate generalizations
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of the results presented in this thesis? What is the “correct” information theory
analogy in this case of many-to-many.
Second, we plan to investigate implementation of the key distribution sys-
tem described in the thesis in real world networks. This will help identify any
potential practical problems that may have not been recognized in the theoreti-
cal/analytical work presented here.
Third, we plan to investigate fast algorithms for group key generation and we
are particularly interested in approaches that lead to reduced key lengths, such
as methods using elliptic curves. In this context we also intent to investigate
applications in conditional access schemes for multicasting of real-time videos and
multimedia information streams. We are also interested in exploring applications
in mobile networks and in networks with rapidly varying topologies which will
cause fast dynamic changes in multicast group membership.
Fourth, a set of parameters identified by our theory is the probabilities of
member revocation pi. Typically these will not be known exactly. How can
they be estimated? What is the error of inaccuracies in the estimation? Can
we obtain robust schemes and what is the cost of those in terms of scalability?
Can we develop universal methods that do not rely on explicit estimates of these
probabilities? Are these related to universal coding? Finally, we are interested
and plan to investigate attacks that are more general and sophisticated than the
collusion attacks described here. Specific problems include intrusion detection,
defense against covert channel use, and defense against schemes exploiting biasing
of the key space by the contributing member.
Multicast security is a key and central problem in the Internet-centric world.
We have investigated some initial problems in a systematic and analytical fashion.
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Much exciting and important research remains to be done.
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